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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court will soon decide if Travis Beckles’s prison
sentence is illegal. Mr. Beckles was sentenced years ago,1 and his appeal to
the Supreme Court is on post-conviction review.2 Normally when the
Supreme Court invalidates a prison sentence in a post-conviction case, the
Court’s holding applies to all other post-conviction cases as well. But the
way Mr. Beckles’s lawyers are arguing his case, relief for Mr. Beckles will
do nothing for prisoners in certain circuits whose sentences would be
illegal for the same reason as Mr. Beckles’s. And if the Supreme Court
does not preemptively address these potential circuit splits in Beckles, then
it may never have a chance to do so.
Mr. Beckles’s challenge to his sentence is based in part on the
Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Johnson v. United States, which held
that the so-called “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act
(ACCA) is unconstitutionally vague.3 ACCA’s residual clause subjected
defendants to longer prison sentences if they had previous convictions for
any crime that “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another.”4 Last April the Court made the rule invalidating
ACCA’s residual clause retroactive in Welch v. United States.5 Johnson and
Welch were blockbuster decisions that have tied up lower courts in a flurry
of litigation that includes thousands of courts of appeals cases.6 The Court
1

United States v. Beckles, 565 U.S. 832, 839 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 2510
(2016).
2
Id.; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, 6, 8, Beckles, 136 S. Ct. 2510 (2016).
3
135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557–58 (2015).
4
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012).
5
136 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016).
6
The Johnson opinion was issued on the last day of the Supreme Court’s 2014 term and has been
cited in over ten times as many lower court decisions as any other case from that term, according to
Westlaw. Welch was decided on April 18, 2016 (an extraordinarily quick nineteen days after the
Supreme Court heard oral argument) and has already been cited 824 times by lower courts. And those
are just the cases that are reported on Westlaw. Most rulings about whether prisoners can benefit from
Johnson and Welch are made in orders that are not on Westlaw. The Eleventh Circuit (which covers
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granted certiorari in Beckles to resolve two questions that have split lower
courts in the wake of Johnson and Welch: whether an identically worded
“residual clause” in the United States Sentencing Guidelines is
unconstitutionally void for vagueness, and, if so, whether the rule
invalidating the Guideline’s residual clause applies retroactively.7
Those are the two questions that Mr. Beckles’s petition for certiorari
directly raises.8 But there are other, equally significant questions that lurk
beneath the surface in Beckles. Moreover, the circuits have already split on
these other questions, or appear poised to do so. These questions will
determine which prisoners would benefit from a favorable decision in
Beckles, as well as which prisoners—including ones sentenced under
ACCA—will benefit from the rule announced in Johnson. One of these
questions is whether the statute of limitations has already expired to raise a
challenge that the Guideline’s residual clause is unconstitutionally void for
vagueness. Prisoners have one year from the date on which the Supreme
Court recognizes a new right to file post-conviction motions asserting that
right.9 Mr. Beckles’s attorneys are arguing that Mr. Beckles is asserting a
right that the Court recognized in Johnson. For that reason, they argue that
the statute of limitations to challenge Guideline sentences expired in June
2016. But some prisoners may not have challenged their Guideline
sentences before that date, and others may need to refile challenges because
their previous attempts were denied. If the Court rules as Mr. Beckles’s
attorneys are urging, all those prisoners who have similarly illegal
sentences may not benefit from a ruling in Mr. Beckles’s favor.
The other question that may prevent prisoners from benefiting from
Johnson (or Beckles) is when courts of appeals should allow prisoners to
challenge their ACCA sentences or their Guideline sentences based on
those decisions. If a prisoner already filed one motion for post-conviction
review in the past, the federal habeas statute requires the prisoner to get
permission from a court of appeals panel in order to file what is called a
“second or successive motion.”10 Nearly all the prisoners who wish to bring
Johnson claims were sentenced years ago, so they already filed their first
post-conviction motion. The courts of appeals have been applying
divergent standards when deciding whether to authorize second or
Alabama, Florida, and Georgia) has said it ruled on “close to two thousand” of these cases as of August
2, 2016. In re Chance, 831 F.3d 1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 2016). The Sixth Circuit (which covers
Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee) said that “roughly 1700 Johnson motions have been filed in
our circuit” as of July 29, 2016. In re Embry, 831 F.3d 377, 382 (6th Cir. 2016).
7
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 2–3, 6 & n.6, Beckles, 136 S. Ct. 2510 (2016).
8
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 5.
9
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) (2012).
10
Id. §§ 2255(h)(2), 2244(b)(2)(A).
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successive motions in these cases. At least one court of appeals—the
Eleventh Circuit—has been denying authorization on the ground that a
prisoner’s sentence might still be lawful based on other provisions the
defendant was never sentenced under and based on other convictions that
were never considered by the court imposing the sentence. One
commentator has called the inconsistent treatment of Johnson claims in
different circuits (and, in particular, the Eleventh Circuit’s outlier
approach) “something very like a travesty of justice.”11 Yet because of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) restrictions on
the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over second or successive post-conviction
cases, the Court may not be able to take another case to address this
problem.
The Court should both be aware of these lurking issues and use
Beckles as the vehicle to weigh in on them. Doing so may be the only way
to ensure that prisoners—particularly those in the Eleventh Circuit—will
have a remedy for their unlawful sentences and the only way to ensure that
any right announced in Beckles applies uniformly across the country. While
the Court typically limits itself to analyzing questions that are directly
raised in the petition for certiorari, AEDPA’s restrictions on the Court’s
jurisdiction are more than a sufficient reason for the Court to depart from
that practice here. Two decades ago, when the Supreme Court upheld
AEDPA’s restrictions on post-conviction review, several Justices warned
that circuit splits related to successive motions might reopen the
constitutionality of AEDPA’s restrictions on the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction.12 As we show below, the aftermath of Johnson and Welch is
precisely what those Justices warned about. Our goal is not to use the postJohnson developments to reopen the question of AEDPA’s
constitutionality. Instead, we aim to show that these developments make
real the constitutional concerns that several Justices raised when they
initially held that AEDPA was constitutional. And the constitutional
concerns that have now materialized (including the troubling state of affairs
in which the courts of appeals unreviewably treat identical post-conviction

11

Noah Feldman, This Is What ‘Travesty of Justice’ Looks Like, BLOOMBERG VIEW (July 22, 2016,
2:39 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-07-22/appeals-court-fumbles-supreme-courtruling [https://perma.cc/WE3V-JLP7]. As we show below, the same problem is already unfolding with
Beckles claims.
12
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 667 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring) (“[I]f it should later turn out
that statutory avenues other than certiorari for reviewing a gatekeeping determination were closed, the
question whether the statute exceeded Congress’s Exceptions Clause power would be open. The
question could arise if the courts of appeals adopted divergent interpretations of the gatekeeper
standard.” (footnote omitted)).
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claims in wildly different ways) suffice as reasons why the Court should
address questions not directly raised in the petition for certiorari in Beckles.
This short Essay proceeds in four parts. Part I provides some
background on how the issues raised by Beckles have divided the courts of
appeals. Part II explains how the courts of appeals could come to different
conclusions on whether the statute of limitations has already expired for the
exact claim that the Supreme Court might grant relief on in Beckles, and
how the Court could write its opinion in Beckles to avoid that result. Part
III explains how some courts of appeals are prematurely denying prisoners
permission to file post-conviction motions raising Johnson claims based on
speculation that those motions will fail on the merits. Many of those cases
have decided questions of first impression about how and when the rule
announced in Johnson invalidates a sentence. AEDPA prevents the
Supreme Court from reviewing those cases. This Essay concludes by
explaining why the Court should use Beckles to clarify that courts of
appeals should generally not be denying authorizations to file successive
motions in this way. This guidance might be the only chance the Supreme
Court ever gets to ensure that the lower courts implement Beckles—and
Johnson—in a uniform way.
I.

BACKGROUND

The questions on which the Court granted certiorari in Beckles turn on
the differences between ACCA and the Sentencing Guidelines. Johnson
held that ACCA’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague, and Welch
applied the rule announced in Johnson retroactively (in other words, to a
case where the prisoner’s conviction already became final). Both ACCA
and the Sentencing Guidelines subject defendants to higher sentences if
they previously committed a crime that “involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”13 Those thirteen words
are called the “residual clause” in both ACCA and the Sentencing
Guidelines (specifically, in a provision known as the “career offender
guideline”), and the identical language in both provisions has always been
interpreted the same way.14

13

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2)
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015), amended by U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES SUPPLEMENT TO THE
2015 MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). Although this language was removed
in the 2016 reiteration of the Sentencing Guidelines, the change benefits no one sentenced prior to
August 2016. See infra text accompanying notes 36–37.
14
See Leah M. Litman, Residual Impact: Resentencing Implications of Johnson’s Potential Ruling
on ACCA’s Constitutionality, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 55, 64 n.46 (2015) (listing cases).
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Beckles deals with how Johnson affects those identical words in the
Sentencing Guidelines. The difference between ACCA and the Guidelines
lies in the kinds of penalties they trigger. ACCA subjects defendants to
mandatory minimum sentences. When a defendant is sentenced using
ACCA’s residual clause, his minimum sentence is fifteen years (with a
maximum of life).15 But without ACCA, the statutory maximum sentence
for the same crime is ten years.16 The Guidelines do not change a
defendant’s statutory minimum or maximum sentence, but they require a
higher advisory sentencing range.17 That range has a significant impact on a
defendant’s ultimate sentence. Though judges technically have discretion to
impose a sentence outside the Guidelines range, the Supreme Court has
explained that the “Sentencing Guidelines represent the Federal
Government’s authoritative view of the appropriate sentences for specific
crimes”18 and are the “lodestone” of federal sentencing.19 District courts
“must begin their analysis with the Guidelines and remain cognizant of
them throughout the sentencing process.”20 The sentencing range also
serves as the “benchmark” according to which a defendant’s sentence is
judged on appeal.21 The Guidelines’ considerable “force as the framework
for sentencing”22 means that frequently “the judge will use the Guidelines
range as the starting point in the analysis and impose a sentence within the
range.”23
Most defendants are sentenced within the Guidelines range. Just last
term, the Supreme Court recognized the “real and pervasive effect the
Guidelines have on sentencing. . . . In less than 20% of cases since 2007
have district courts ‘imposed above- or below-Guidelines sentences absent
a Government motion.’”24 The career offender guideline challenged in
Beckles has an especially significant pull. Less than 0.57% percent of drug
offenders who are sentenced without that Guideline receive sentences
longer than the lowest end of the Guidelines range for defendants who were
sentenced with that Guideline, even though the defendants were sentenced
15

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Id. § 924(g).
17
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (invalidating the statute that made the
Guidelines mandatory).
18
Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2085 (2013).
19
Id. at 2084.
20
Id. at 2083 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 n.6 (2007)).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 529 (2011) (plurality opinion).
24
Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1346 (2016) (quoting Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at
2084).
16
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for the same crimes.25 Moreover, sentences increase severely as a result of
this Guideline. The average sentence imposed on drug offenders classified
as career offenders (138.6 months) was over twice as long as the average
sentence imposed on drug offenders not classified as career offenders (62
months).26
Mr. Beckles’s case illustrates how much the residual clause in the
Guidelines can increase a sentence. Without the residual clause, Mr.
Beckles would have had a Guidelines sentence of fifteen years in prison.27
But because he had a single prior conviction for possession of a sawed-off
shotgun (ironically, the same exact crime that was used to increase the
defendant’s sentence in Johnson), Mr. Beckles was sentenced using the
Guideline’s residual clause, and his Guidelines range jumped to thirty years
to life in prison.28 The judge gave Mr. Beckles a sentence at the very
bottom of that higher range.29 If the Supreme Court grants Mr. Beckles
relief, his sentence could be halved. This case is not even the most dramatic
example. Some prisoners’ current sentences are three or four times higher
than what could be lawful after Beckles.30
Since the Court decided Johnson and Welch, the courts of appeals
have been split on two questions: whether the Guideline’s residual clause is
invalid, and whether the Supreme Court has “made” the rule invalidating
the Guideline retroactive. On the first question, only the Eleventh Circuit
says the Guideline is not unconstitutionally void for vagueness.31 All eleven
other courts of appeals have either held or assumed otherwise.32 The
Eleventh Circuit’s position is especially striking because the United States

25

See Brief of the Federal Public & Community Defenders & the National Ass’n of Federal
Defenders as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 14, Jones v. United States, No. 15-8629 (U.S. Apr.
21, 2016).
26
See SENTENCING RES. COUNSEL PROJECT, DATA ANALYSES 1 (2016).
27
See Brief for Petitioner at 4a, Beckles v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2510 (2016).
28
Id. at 6.
29
Id. at 6–7.
30
For example, a defendant who is convicted of being a felon in possession of a gun and has two
previous felony convictions normally gets a sentencing range of fifteen to twenty-one months. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(a)(7) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). If one of those
convictions meets the residual clause definition, the range becomes forty-one to fifty-one months. See
id. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). If both do, it becomes sixty-three to seventy-eight months. See id. § 2K2.1(a)(2).
This increase is automatic even if the earlier convictions were punished with just a year in state prison.
See id. § 4B1.2(a).
31
See United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1189 (11th Cir. 2015).
32
See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 27, at 28 n.7 (listing cases). Since that brief was filed, the en
banc Seventh Circuit has also ruled that the residual clause in the Guidelines is unconstitutionally
vague. See United States v. Hurlburt, Nos. 14-3611, 15-1686, 2016 WL 4506717, at *7 (7th Cir. Aug.
29, 2016) (en banc).
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has been conceding that the Guideline is invalid.33 It is not difficult to
understand why the United States is doing so (and why the Eleventh
Circuit’s lone view is likely wrong). If the residual clause in the Sentencing
Guidelines is valid, courts must keep trying to interpret it, since a district
court’s failure to correctly calculate a Guidelines range is procedural error
that requires resentencing.34 But it makes little sense for courts to continue
interpreting the residual clause, given that Johnson described the inquiry as
nothing more than “guesswork” and concluded that “trying to derive
meaning from the residual clause . . . [is] a failed enterprise.”35
It also matters little that the Sentencing Commission deleted the
Guideline’s residual clause in a recent amendment because the Commission
did not apply that amendment retroactively.36 Therefore, defendants who
were sentenced before that amendment became effective on August 1, 2016
would still be subject to the residual clause,37 and courts would be forced to
33

See Leah Litman, Circuit Splits & Original Writs, CASETEXT (Dec. 17, 2015),
https://casetext.com/posts/circuit-splits-original-writs [https://perma.cc/9DBW-VTBH] (documenting
concessions).
34
See supra notes 17–21. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has expressly told district courts that
“[a]lthough Johnson abrogated the previous decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting the residual
clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, sentencing courts interpreting the residual clause of the
guidelines must still adhere to the reasoning of cases interpreting the nearly identical language in the
Act.” Matchett, 802 F.3d at 1195–96.
35
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2560 (2015) (citation omitted). For more colorful
explanations in some of Justice Scalia’s opinions, see Litman, supra note 14, at 58; Derby v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 2858, 2859 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“If it is uncertain
how this Court will apply Sykes and the rest of our ACCA cases going forward, it is even more
uncertain how our lower-court colleagues will deal with them. Conceivably, they will simply throw the
opinions into the air in frustration, and give free rein to their own feelings as to what offenses should be
considered crimes of violence . . . .”).
36
Chief Judge Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Remarks for Public Meeting 4 (Jan.
8, 2016), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hearings-and-meetings/
20160108/meeting_minutes.pdf [https://perma.cc/HD3U-4WXG]. One of the sentencing commissioners
who voted not to retroactively apply the amendment is Judge William H. Pryor, Jr., who also decided
that Johnson does not apply to the Guidelines retroactively as a member of two Eleventh Circuit panels.
See Matchett, 802 F.3d at 1195–96 (holding that Johnson does apply to the Sentencing Guidelines); In
re Rivero, 797 F.3d 986, 988 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that a rule that Johnson applies to the
Sentencing Guidelines has not been “made retroactive” by the Supreme Court); see also Andrew
Hessick, Should Judges Who Sit on the Sentencing Commission Rule on the Legality of Sentencing
Guidelines?, NOTICE & COMMENT (Oct. 15, 2015), http://yalejreg.com/nc/should-judges-who-sit-onthe-sentencing-commission-rule-on-the-legality-of-sentencing-guidelines/
[https://perma.cc/F4EHMPCG] (noting that Judge Pryor’s “participation in [Matchett and Rivero] raises separation of powers
concerns”).
37
The Guidelines direct courts to apply the Sentencing Guidelines issued by the Sentencing
Commission that are “in effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced” unless doing so would
“violate the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution,” in which case the court is to use the
Guidelines Manual “in effect on the date that the offense of conviction was committed.” U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 1B1.11(a), (b)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015); see
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii) (2012). Because the Guideline amendment deleting the residual clause
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determine whether these defendants’ convictions fall within the residual
clause’s ambit. But as Johnson set out, that entire enterprise is a farce. And
everywhere but in the Eleventh Circuit, that enterprise ended when Johnson
was decided.38
The more difficult question is whether the Supreme Court has “made”
retroactive a rule invalidating the residual clause in the Guideline. Before a
prisoner can file a successive § 2255 motion in a district court, AEDPA
requires a court of appeals to certify that the motion satisfies certain
preconditions, which here means that the motion “contain[s] . . . a new rule
of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
Supreme Court.”39 That is, the prisoner needs to show not only that a new
rule is retroactive but also that the Supreme Court has made that rule
retroactive. Fifteen years ago, the Supreme Court adopted a frighteningly
narrow definition of what it means to “make” a rule retroactive, coming
close to suggesting that the Supreme Court makes a rule retroactive only
where the Court itself applies that rule to a case on collateral review.40 The
courts of appeals initially divided on whether the Supreme Court had made
the rule in Johnson—that ACCA’s residual clause is unconstitutionally
void for vagueness—retroactive. The Tenth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits
said it had not; other circuits said it had, at least for purposes of authorizing

imposes less punishment than the prior version of the Guideline, courts could apply the amendment to
defendants who committed their offenses prior to the amendment, but were sentenced after the
amendment.
38
Aside from holding the Guideline invalid, one way for the Supreme Court to avoid this result
would be to declare that any sentence based on the Guideline is unreasonable. This is the approach that
Judge Ikuta on the Ninth Circuit urged in United States v. Lee, 821 F.3d 1124, 1136 (9th Cir. 2016)
(Ikuta, J., dissenting). It is not clear why this approach would improve on declaring a Guideline
unconstitutionally vague: if applying a Guideline whose language is unconstitutionally vague is always
unreasonable, why not just hold the Guideline unconstitutionally vague? Judge Ikuta’s proposed rule
would also raise difficult retroactivity questions because the nature and source of such a rule would be
unclear, given that it is not entirely clear what reasonableness review of sentencing determinations is.
Reasonableness review is partially a judicial creation, but also partially statutory, see United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005), and reasonableness review has both procedural and substantive
components, see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007). It is therefore not clear if Mr.
Beckles would benefit from a rule that said that applying the Guideline is unreasonable given that Mr.
Beckles’s case is on collateral review. Because this Essay is concerned about the possibility that a rule
would benefit Mr. Beckles while leaving certain others out of luck, we do not focus on the possibility
that the Supreme Court will hold that sentences based on the residual clause of the Sentencing
Guidelines are unreasonable.
39
28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(h)(2), 2244(b)(2)(A) (2012). Section 2255 is the post-conviction remedy for
federal prisoners. See id. § 2255(a).
40
Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663 (2001). For more on Tyler and on the different approaches the
courts of appeals have taken to the “made retroactive” requirement, see Leah M. Litman, Resentencing
in the Shadow of Johnson v. United States, 28 FED. SENT’G REP. 45, 48–49 (2015).

563

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

successive motions.41 Welch resolved that split by definitively making
Johnson retroactively applicable.
Something similar has happened with the rule that the Guideline is
unconstitutionally vague. Again, all courts of appeals other than the
Eleventh Circuit have held or assumed that Johnson makes the identical
Sentencing Guideline language unconstitutionally vague. But of those
courts, two have said that the Supreme Court has not “made” that rule
retroactive;42 the rest have said it has.43 Beckles would resolve this split. If
the Court holds the Guideline unconstitutionally void for vagueness, it
would then decide whether that rule applies retroactively because Mr.
Beckles’s case has already become final. And applying the rule that the
Guideline is invalid to a case on collateral review would leave no doubt
that the Supreme Court has made that rule retroactive.
II.

THE § 2255 ONE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Even if the Supreme Court rules that Mr. Beckles’s sentence must be
reduced, there would be another potential hurdle to clear for other
prisoners who received identical sentences to Mr. Beckles’s: the statute of
limitations. The one-year statute of limitations applicable to § 2255
motions runs from “the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court.”44 In Dodd v. United States, the Supreme
Court made clear that the statute of limitations runs from the date on which
a right asserted was recognized by the Supreme Court, rather than the date
on which that right was made retroactive.45 Mr. Beckles will not be barred
by that one-year statute of limitations, since his § 2255 proceeding began
long before that deadline. But the same will not be true for others who have
sentences identical to Mr. Beckles’s. Depending on how the Court writes
the opinion in Beckles, some courts of appeals may say that the time has
already expired for other prisoners to challenge their sentences.
Mr. Beckles’s attorneys have argued in their brief to the Supreme
Court that prisoners sentenced under the Guidelines are asserting a right

41

See Leah M. Litman, The Exceptional Circumstances of Johnson v. United States, 114 MICH. L.
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 81, 85 (2016) (identifying circuit cases).
42
See In re Arnick, 826 F.3d 787, 788 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (“[T]he Supreme Court has not
addressed whether this arguably new rule of criminal procedure [established in Johnson] applies
retroactively to cases on collateral review.”); Donnell v. United States, 826 F.3d 1014, 1017 (8th Cir.
2016) (“Donnell’s successive motion seeks to assert a new right that has not been recognized by the
Supreme Court or made retroactive on collateral review.”).
43
See, e.g., Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at 3–4 (discussing circuit split).
44
§ 2255(f)(3) (emphasis added).
45
545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005).
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that was recognized in Johnson.46 The implication of this argument—which
the attorneys recognized when they urged the Supreme Court to take the
case47—is that the statute of limitations already expired for all other
prisoners to argue that their sentences are unlawful for the same reason as
Mr. Beckles’s sentence. Johnson was decided June 26, 2015. That means
the deadline for claims based on Johnson expired on June 26, 2016, one
day before the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Beckles.48
If the Court takes the approach that Mr. Beckles’s attorneys are
urging, Mr. Beckles may have his sentence declared illegal, but other
prisoners would not because their claims would be foreclosed by the statute
of limitations. The statute of limitations does not make a difference for Mr.
Beckles, since his § 2255 proceeding began before June 26, 2016. But the
statute of limitations would pose a bar to other prisoners whose sentences
would be illegal for the same reason as Mr. Beckles’s sentence. The statute
of limitations would bar prisoners who, like Mr. Beckles, filed an initial
motion for post-conviction review and resentencing, if they did not file that
motion before June 26.49 And even for prisoners who filed prior to June 26,
their only hope would be for the Supreme Court to either grant, vacate, and
remand their cases (assuming they filed petitions for certiorari) or for lower
courts to revisit their earlier rulings.
The statute of limitations would pose an even more troubling problem
for prisoners who are raising those challenges in successive motions for
post-conviction review. Again, before a prisoner can file a successive
46

See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 27, at 15–17 (“Johnson’s rule is new as to Mr. Beckles
because it was announced several years after his conviction became final, and it expressly overruled
precedent foreclosing a vagueness challenge.”); id. at 14 (“Johnson has retroactive effect in this
collateral proceeding. Johnson announced the following rule of constitutional law: a legal provision is
void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause where it ‘requires a court to picture the kind of
conduct that the crime involves in “the ordinary case,” and to judge whether that abstraction presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury.’” (citation omitted)); id. at 46 (“Johnson has retroactive effect
in this collateral case.”).
47
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 5–6 (arguing that the Supreme Court needed to
decide the case in its 2015 Term because “the one-year statute of limitations governing collateral
Johnson claims will expire on June 26, 2016”). One of the petitioner’s amici also noted this in the brief
they filed at the merits stage. See Brief of the Federal Public & Community Defenders & the National
Ass’n of Federal Defenders as Amici Curiae, supra note 25, at 2 (explicitly arguing that the statute of
limitations has run).
48
The statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling, Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649
(2010), and excepts cases of actual innocence, McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013). A
favorable decision in Beckles could mean that prisoners sentenced under the career offender guideline
are actually innocent of their sentences, but this is by no means certain. See Litman, supra note 14, at
65–73 (discussing how cases are unclear on whether this kind of legal innocence qualifies as actual
innocence).
49
See Dodd, 545 U.S. at 359 (“The limitation period in ¶6(3) applies to ‘all motions’ under § 2255,
initial motions as well as second or successive ones.”).
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§ 2255 motion based on a new Supreme Court decision, AEDPA requires
that the motion be “certified . . . to contain . . . a new rule of constitutional
law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme
Court.”50 Dodd held that the statute of limitations for successive motions,
like the statute of limitations for initial motions, runs from the date on
which the right asserted was recognized, rather than the date on which that
right was made retroactive.51 Therefore, prisoners seeking to file a
successive motion must show that the Supreme Court has recognized a new
right and that the Supreme Court has made that right retroactive within one
year. Dodd explained, “an applicant who files a second or successive
motion seeking to take advantage of a new rule of constitutional law will be
time barred except in the rare case in which this Court announces a new
rule of constitutional law and makes it retroactive within one year.”52
Two courts of appeals—in addition to the Eleventh Circuit—have
held that the Supreme Court has not “made” retroactive a rule invalidating
the Guideline.53 Prisoners therefore cannot challenge their Guideline
sentences in these circuits. If the Court writes the opinion in Beckles the
way Mr. Beckles’s attorneys are arguing, prisoners in those circuits may
not be able to challenge their Guideline sentences after the Court
retroactively applied a rule invalidating the Guideline. Before Beckles, the
Supreme Court had not “made” a rule invalidating the Guideline
retroactive, but after Beckles, it would be too late to challenge a sentence
imposed under the Guideline. And unlike for initial motions for postconviction review, AEDPA provides that the “denial of an authorization by
a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be
appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a
writ of certiorari.”54 That means prisoners in those cases may be forever
stuck with an incorrect ruling in their cases, even if the Supreme Court
corrects this mistake in Mr. Beckles’s case.55
Altogether, this could mean that Beckles will benefit the litigant
whose case happened to win the certiorari lottery, while arbitrarily leaving
others with equally meritorious claims shut out of court simply because
they did not file § 2255 motions before June 26, 2016 (in other words,

50

28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(h)(2), 2244(b)(2)(A) (2012).
Dodd, 545 U.S. at 357.
52
Id. at 359.
53
See In re Arnick, 826 F.3d 787, 788 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); Donnell v. United States,
826 F.3d 1014, 1017 (8th Cir. 2016).
54
§ 2244(b)(3)(E).
55
See supra note 48 and infra note 66 for discussion of equitable exceptions to the statute of
limitations.
51
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because they did not file a Beckles claim before the Court granted certiorari
in Beckles or before the Court held the Guideline invalid). Prisoners could
also be shut out merely because a court of appeals denied their earlier
motion, even though the prisoner filed that motion before June 26.
The Court should prevent that result. There are many reasons why
prisoners may not have filed before June 26, 2016 or may need to refile
after a favorable decision in Beckles. The Court should therefore clarify
that it is recognizing a “new right”—albeit one that represents the best
reading of precedent—in Beckles that resets the statute of limitations. An
opinion by Judge Martin on the Eleventh Circuit highlighted this possibility
shortly before the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Beckles. She
explained:
The statute of limitations for § 2255 motions based on Johnson may expire in
the next few days. Of course, if the Supreme Court overrules Matchett, that
new case could start a new one-year clock. If that happens, the dates of the
one-year statute of limitations will turn in part on whether Johnson’s voiding
of the identical § 4B1.2(a)(2) language was “apparent to all reasonable
jurists.”56

Judge Martin therefore argued that a new Supreme Court ruling
extending Johnson to the Sentencing Guidelines would announce a new
rule and reset the statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit later suggested
the same.57 That court warned that “it is possible that the [Supreme] Court’s
potential invalidation of the residual clause would come too late in our
court” and “[p]risoners unaware of the possibility of challenging their
Guidelines sentences until after the Supreme Court invalidated the residual
clause would be out of luck, at least if the Supreme Court did not also make
clear in Beckles that it was announcing a new constitutional rule, distinct
from Johnson.”58
Recognizing that a favorable decision in Beckles creates a new rule
would be consistent with the Supreme Court’s retroactivity doctrine. When
the Supreme Court held in Teague v. Lane that “new” constitutional rules
of criminal procedure are generally not retroactive, it defined a “new” rule
as one that “was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the
defendant’s conviction became final.”59 Commentators have long said that

56

In re McCall, 826 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 2016) (Martin, J., concurring) (emphasis added)
(quoting Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107 (2013)).
57
See In re Embry, 831 F.3d 377, 378–79 (6th Cir. 2016) (transferring case to district court to be
held in abeyance pending the Beckles decision).
58
Id. at 381.
59
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989).
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Teague’s definition of “newness” is “far too expansive,”60 and subsequent
cases have held that a rule is dictated by precedent and therefore not new if
the rule would have been “apparent to all reasonable jurists.”61 The
Supreme Court has further explained: “That the outcome in [a case] was
susceptible to debate among reasonable minds is evidenced . . . by the
differing positions taken by the judges of the Courts of Appeals . . . .”62
Here, the disagreement about whether Johnson applies to the Guidelines
suggests that relief for Mr. Beckles would announce a “new rule.”
Moreover, describing as new a rule that invalidates the Guideline does not
mean that a rule invalidating the Guideline would be an unjustified
extension of precedent—far from it. A rule can be new and still represent
the best reading of precedent.63
But if the Supreme Court decides Beckles in the way Mr. Beckles’s
attorneys have urged the Supreme Court to rule (holding that no “new rule”
is required to apply Johnson to the Guidelines), there is a risk that the
decision will do prisoners no good unless they happened to file a claim
before June 26, 2016 and the claim remains pending. Despite the public
defenders’ best efforts,64 there are several reasons why prisoners may not
have filed initial or successive § 2255 motions prior to June 26.
One, precedent in some circuits squarely foreclosed these motions, so
prisoners could not file before Welch was decided on April 18, 2016. Even
after Welch, Eleventh Circuit precedent barred Johnson claims by prisoners
who were sentenced using the residual clause in the Guidelines. Lawyers
may not have been able to identify all of the prisoners with Johnson claims
in the short period after Welch, and some prisoners may have chosen not to
try and file a motion that they knew was barred by circuit precedent. The
Eleventh Circuit has even continued to deny authorizations after certiorari
was granted in Beckles and has rejected requests to hold cases in
abeyance.65 All those prisoners would need to refile requests for
60

Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional
Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1816 (1991).
61
Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527–28 (1997).
62
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990). A subsequent case relied on the fact that “[t]wo
Federal Courts of Appeals . . . reached conflicting holdings” to conclude that a rule was new. Caspari v.
Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 395 (1994).
63
See Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1110–11 (2013) (“In acknowledging that fact, we
do not cast doubt on, or at all denigrate, Padilla. Courts often need to, and do, break new ground; it is
the very premise of Teague that a decision can be right and also be novel.”).
64
As of August 2, 2016, the Eleventh Circuit alone had ruled on “close to two thousand” of these
certification motions. In re Chance, 831 F.3d 1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 2016).
65
See, e.g., In re Anderson, 829 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2016). Other circuits have elected to
transfer the motions to district courts and stay them in abeyance of Beckles. See supra note 57 and
accompanying text.
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authorization after Beckles. But they might not be able to do that unless
Beckles announces a “new rule.”66
Two, in the wake of Welch, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that requests for
permission to file § 2255 motions are governed by § 2244(b)(1)’s
requirement that courts must dismiss any claim that was presented in a
prior motion.67 This interpretation of §§ 2255 and 2244 (which is a minority
view) means that prisoners cannot just refile claims that were rejected prior
to Beckles.68 Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has specified that it will not have
jurisdiction over certification motions raising previously presented claims
“unless and until the Supreme Court establishes in Beckles or some other
future decision ‘a new rule of constitutional law.’”69 Put another way, the
Eleventh Circuit has already said that Beckles will do nothing for prisoners
who already filed a § 2255 motion if the case does not announce a “new
rule of constitutional law,” even if the Court announces that Mr. Beckles’s
sentence is invalid. Mr. Beckles will benefit from that rule, but others
might not, even if their sentences became final at the same time.
Three, basic facts about prison litigation mean that some prisoners
may not have filed before June 26, 2016. A prisoner may be without a
lawyer, for example. It is also difficult to identify prisoners who were
sentenced in the same manner as Mr. Beckles: the judgment in a case does
not indicate which Guidelines a prisoner was sentenced under. Even when
this information is recorded elsewhere, it can be hard to uncover.70 One of
the few documents that might list this information is the prisoner’s
presentence investigation report (PSR), which the Bureau of Prisons bars
66

Other courts toll the statute of limitations for the disposition of successive motions. See, e.g.,
Orona v. United States, 826 F.3d 1196, 1198 (9th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). The Eleventh Circuit
adjudicates requests for certification within thirty days, see In re Clayton, 829 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir.
2016) (Martin & Pryor, JJ., concurring in the result), and denies them with prejudice, so there may not
be much resultant tolling.
67
See In re Baptiste, 828 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2016); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (2012) (referencing
“application under section 2254,” which applies to state prisoners).
68
See In re Bradford, 830 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that § 2244 “removes our
jurisdiction to consider” a prisoner’s motion to certify a Johnson motion if the prisoner asked for
permission to file the same motion in the past). For an explanation of why the Eleventh Circuit’s
insistence that the gatekeeping requirements in §§ 2244 and 2255 are jurisdictional is likely incorrect,
see Leah M. Litman & Luke C. Beasley, Jurisdiction and Resentencing: How Prosecutorial Waiver
Can Offer Remedies Congress Has Denied, 101 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 91, 112 (2016) (“Gonzalez
makes clear that only a prisoner’s failure to seek or obtain authorization from a court of appeals
deprives a district court of jurisdiction over a successive petition. Once the prisoner has filed for and
obtained authorization, he has cleared the lone jurisdictional hurdle.”).
69
E.g., In re Anderson, 829 F.3d at 1293 (quoting § 2255(h)(2)).
70
Chief Judge Patti B. Saris, supra note 36, at 6–7 (noting that sentencing documentation does not
identify which provision led to career offender designation or which criminal history events were
counted as predicates).
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prisoners from possessing for security reasons.71 PSRs are also typically
sealed, which means that lawyers other than the counsel of record at
sentencing will not have access to them.72
In part for these reasons, prisoners in all but one circuit (the First,73
Third,74 Fourth,75 Fifth,76 Sixth,77 Seventh,78 Eighth,79 Ninth,80 Tenth,81
Eleventh,82 and D.C.83 Circuits) have requested authorization to raise
Johnson-related claims in successive § 2255 motions after June 26, 2016.
That is, these prisoners sought permission from the courts of appeals to
challenge their sentences after the statute of limitations would have expired
if the Court holds that a rule invalidating the Guideline is not a new rule (as
Mr. Beckles’s attorneys are arguing). Unless the Supreme Court holds that
Beckles creates a “new rule,” all those motions may be denied as untimely.
For all those reasons, the Supreme Court should clarify that a decision
invalidating the Guideline’s residual clause is a “new rule.” Doing so
avoids the possibility that prisoners would be time-barred from challenging
their Guideline sentences before the Supreme Court actually held the
Guideline invalid. It also addresses an issue that likely precipitated the

71

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 10
(2014), https://www.bop.gov/resources/pdfs/legal_guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/AFA3-GCRT] (“The
PSR . . . contain[s] sensitive information regarding an inmate’s social contacts and criminal history, and
are not permitted to be retained in the possession of the inmate.”).
72
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 advisory committee’s note to 1974 amendment (indicating PSRs should
be sealed and only opened on order of the court).
73
See In re Allen, No. 16-2079 (1st Cir. filed Aug. 22, 2016) (appears to assert a Johnson claim).
74
See In re Little, No. 16-3023 (3d Cir. filed June 30, 2016) (appears to assert a Beckles claim)
(noting the application was received June 30, dated June 25, and postmarked June 27). The application
was transferred to the Fourth Circuit because the original conviction was entered in Virginia. Id.
75
See In re Buckner, No. 16-9960 (4th Cir. filed July 7, 2016) (appears to assert a Beckles claim)
(noting the application was initially filed in the district court, apparently in April 2016).
76
See In re Bunn, No. 16-30730 (5th Cir. filed June 28, 2016) (appears to assert a Beckles claim).
77
See In re Bradshaw, No. 16-2040 (6th Cir. filed July 20, 2016) (appears to assert a Beckles
claim). The docket notes the application was initially filed in the district court, apparently in June 2016.
Id.
78
See In re Glenn, No. 16-2957 (7th Cir. filed July 18, 2016) (appears to assert a Beckles claim).
The docket notes the application was initially filed in the district court. Id.
79
See In re Larimer, No. 16-3162 (8th Cir. filed July 21, 2016) (appears to assert a Beckles claim).
The docket notes the application was initially filed in the district court in July 2016. Id.
80
See In re Toussaint, No. 16-72575 (9th Cir. filed Aug. 2, 2016) (appears to assert a Beckles
claim). The docket notes the application was initially filed in the district court on June 27, 2016. Id.
81
See In re Ramirez, No. 16-4125 (10th Cir. filed July 7, 2016) (appears to assert a Beckles claim).
The request was subsequently denied. In re Ramirez, No. 16-4125 (10th Cir. July 25, 2016).
82
See In re McCoy, No. 16-15659 (11th Cir. filed Aug. 25, 2016) (appears to assert a Beckles
claim).
83
See In re Safarini, No. 16-3094 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 5, 2016) (appears to assert a Beckles claim);
In re Brooks, No. 16-3077 (D.C. Cir. filed June 27, 2016) (appears to assert a Beckles claim).
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certiorari grant in Beckles. If the only circuit split the Court was concerned
about was the split on whether the Guideline remains invalid, why not grant
certiorari in a case on direct review? A case like that would not raise any
questions about retroactivity, since relief on direct review does not depend
on whether a rule is “new” or not. Therefore, the Supreme Court likely
granted certiorari in Beckles to address the circuit split that had emerged
over whether the Court had “made” retroactive a rule invalidating the
Guideline.
Ordinarily, the Court can address a split on whether it has made a new
rule retroactive by retroactively applying that rule to a case that has already
become final. Indeed, that is precisely what happened in Welch: the Court
retroactively applied the rule announced in Johnson, which allowed
prisoners to show beyond any doubt that the Supreme Court had made the
rule announced in Johnson retroactive. But the same may not be possible in
Beckles if the Court holds that a rule invalidating the Guideline is not a new
rule (as Mr. Beckles’s attorneys are arguing): the Court could retroactively
apply a rule invalidating the Guideline, but doing so would not allow
prisoners to file successive motions based on that rule because the statute
of limitations to do so would have already expired. In the Sixth Circuit’s
words, “[h]ow strange.”84 Why permit “successive motions that are barred
under the statute of limitations in § 2255(f)(3)?”85 “It helps no one” to
“authorize the filing of successive motions that are routinely barred by the
statute of limitations.”86 The prisoners who could potentially benefit from
Beckles include prisoners in the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, which
have held that the Supreme Court has not made a rule invalidating the
Guideline retroactive. But if the Court holds that a rule invalidating the
Guideline is not a new rule (as Mr. Beckles’s attorneys are arguing),
Beckles would not benefit those prisoners. For this reason, it makes a good
deal of sense for the Court to clarify that a decision invalidating the
Guideline resets the statute of limitations to challenge the Guideline.
Of course, the Supreme Court could wait to see whether courts
dismiss Beckles claims on statute of limitations grounds and try to pick up
another case to address this issue. That is, the Supreme Court could wait to
see whether courts of appeals say that the statute of limitations has already
expired on Beckles claims and, if they do, review those determinations by
way of yet another petition for certiorari. The same possibility does not
exist, however, for the second issue lurking beneath Beckles: whether

84
85
86

In re Embry, 831 F.3d 377, 381 (6th Cir. 2016).
Id.
Id. (quoting Donnell v. United States, 826 F.3d 1014, 1016 (8th Cir. 2016)).
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courts of appeals should grant authorization to file a successive motion
where it is not clear if a prisoner’s sentence depended on the residual
clause. Beckles may be the Supreme Court’s only opportunity to speak on
this question, which would affect both Johnson claims and Beckles claims.
III.

BECKLES AND SUCCESSIVE § 2255 MOTIONS

How the Court defines the “right” in Beckles also affects whether
courts will even allow successive motions to be filed based on that case.
The Court should use Beckles—which may present the only such
opportunity for the Court to speak on this issue—to clarify how courts of
appeals should determine whether to “authorize” successive § 2255
motions in cases where a prisoner claims his or her sentence depends on the
residual clause. In this Part, we list some of the problems that arose in
lower courts in the aftermath of Johnson and Welch and explain how the
Court could prevent these problems from repeating themselves after
Beckles. We then argue that the Supreme Court should explain when and
why Beckles makes a sentence illegal to ensure that lower courts analyze
Beckles claims in a uniform way.
Again, before a prisoner can file a successive § 2255 motion based on
a new Supreme Court decision, AEDPA requires that the motion be
“certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of
appeals to contain . . . a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to
cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.”87 The “section 2244”
referred to there is another part of AEDPA, which says that a court of
appeals “may authorize the filing of a second or successive application only
if it determines that the application makes a prima facie showing that the
application satisfies the requirements of this subsection.”88 Section 2244
also provides that the Supreme Court cannot grant petitions for certiorari to
review the “grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file
a second or successive application.”89
The lack of review has meant that the lower courts face little
accountability in their decisions to deny permission to file second or
successive § 2255 motions. After Johnson, the Eleventh Circuit frequently
denied authorization to file successive § 2255 motions on the ground that a
prisoner will not benefit from the “new rule” recognized in Johnson. This
happened in two ways. First, the court ruled that Johnson categorically
does not apply to the provision under which the prisoner was sentenced (for

87
88
89
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Id. § 2244(b)(3)(C) (emphasis added).
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example, the residual clause of the Sentencing Guidelines or similar but
slightly different language in another penal statute).90 Second, the court
ruled that the prisoner’s criminal history includes prior convictions that
could be used to increase the prisoner’s sentence in the same way through a
provision that survived Johnson.
Other courts that have denied authorizations have done so primarily
on the first ground.91 The Supreme Court has some ability to weigh in on
this kind of reasoning via cases that raise the same issue but were brought
by a prisoner who never filed a § 2255 motion in the past and thus did not
need to get permission to file a successive motion. This is how the Supreme
Court came to hear Welch and also how it will hear Beckles.
But the same is not true for denials of permission to file successive
§ 2255 motions that are premised on the second kind of reasoning—that a
prisoner’s § 2255 motion (which has not even been filed yet) will fail on
the merits because the prisoner’s record shows that the prisoner’s prior
convictions qualify as criminal history predicates under a provision that
remains valid. This kind of reasoning would not be reviewable if the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case where a § 2255 motion was
adjudicated on the merits, because the Court would have no occasion in a
case like that to review what “prima facie showing” AEDPA requires or
what kinds of evidence may be used to establish a prima facie showing.
The absence of any accountability that might result from the
possibility of Supreme Court review in these cases has created a severe
problem. The Eleventh Circuit ruled on nearly two thousand requests to
certify second or successive § 2255 motions based on Johnson in the three
months after the decision in Welch.92 Those rulings show that the court is
both internally divided and likely wrong on at least two questions that
come into play only at the authorization stage, and only when a court of
appeals denies authorization on the ground that a prisoner’s prior
90

See, e.g., In re Griffin, 823 F.3d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Griffin is unable to make a prima
facie showing that Johnson applies to him in light of our binding precedent in Matchett that the
Sentencing Guidelines cannot be challenged as unconstitutionally vague.” (citing United States v.
Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1193–96 (11th Cir. 2015))); In re Sapp, 827 F.3d 1334, 1336 (11th Cir. 2016)
(denying motion based on Griffin).
91
See In re Arnick, 826 F.3d 787, 788 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); Donnell v. United States,
826 F.3d 1014, 1015 (8th Cir. 2016).
The other non-Eleventh Circuit cases available on searchable databases are: Dawkins v. United
States, 809 F.3d 953, 956 (7th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); Dawkins v. United States, 829 F.3d 549, 549
(7th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (same case); Hill v. United States, 827 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 2016)
(denying motion); and United States v. Bolden, 645 F. App’x 282, 283 (4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam)
(relying on prior precedent). Cf. United States v. Bell, 622 F. App’x 770, 771 n.1 (10th Cir. 2015)
(referring to denial of authorization).
92
See In re Chance, 831 F.3d 1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 2016).
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convictions still qualify as criminal history predicates (in other words, only
in cases that the Supreme Court cannot review): (1) what is required to
make a prima facie showing, and (2) what law applies when assessing
whether a prisoner has made a prima facie showing. As we discuss below,
the Eleventh Circuit’s outlier view on these two questions has meant
prisoners with nearly identical sentences (as in, ACCA sentences that were
based on the same state crimes) have fared differently depending on what
certification panel they drew. Most of those rulings were made without
input from a lawyer, nearly all of them are never reported in a commercial
reporter or on the court’s website, and none are subject to further review.
A.

Scope of Substantive Rule

The Eleventh Circuit appears to be internally divided on what amounts
to a prima facie showing that a prisoner “falls within the scope of the
substantive rule announced” by the Supreme Court. For example, some
Eleventh Circuit decisions maintain that a prisoner makes a prima facie
showing if no “binding precedent” indicates that the prisoner’s prior
convictions support an ACCA sentence despite Johnson.93 Other panels
disagree and will determine as a matter of first impression whether a
prisoner’s prior convictions can still support an ACCA sentence.94 Other
panels have said prisoners must “make a prima facie showing that they
previously were sentenced, at least in part, in reliance on the ACCA’s nowvoided residual clause.”95 Other panels have instead framed a prima facie
showing as one where “the record does not refute” the prisoner’s assertion
“that the sentencing court relied on the residual clause.”96 And these are just
the divisions that appear in decisions that were published on Westlaw. The
court has also issued thousands of rulings that are not available in any
commercial reporter.
Also troubling is the Eleventh Circuit’s method of considering
whether a prisoner’s prior convictions can support his sentence under one
of the definitions of “violent felony” that remain valid. Along with the
residual clause definition at issue in Johnson, Welch, and Beckles, both
ACCA and the Guidelines also define “violent felony” (or “crime of
violence” in the Sentencing Guidelines) as any crime that “has as an

93

See In re Leonard, Nos. 16-13528-J, 16-13804-J, 16-13857-J, 2016 WL 3885037, at *3–4 (11th
Cir. July 13, 2016); In re Parker, 827 F.3d 1286, 1288 (11th Cir. 2016).
94
See, e.g., In re Smith, 829 F.3d 1276, 1280 n.4 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Although we have binding
precedent to support our conclusion, we do not concede that such precedent is required.”); In re Sams,
830 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2016).
95
E.g., In re Moore, 830 F.3d 1268, 1270 (11th Cir. 2016).
96
E.g., In re Rogers, 825 F.3d 1335, 1339 (11th Cir. 2016).
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element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person of another,”97 as well as any crime that “is burglary, arson, or
extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conducts that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”98 And
Johnson was careful to say that the decision “does not call into question . . .
the four enumerated offenses, or the remainder of the . . . definition of a
violent felony.”99 Therefore, the decision in Johnson—and a future decision
in Beckles—does not affect sentences that are valid due to the element-offorce or enumerated-offense clauses.
The Eleventh Circuit has held in hundreds of cases that prisoners
cannot file § 2255 motions if the convictions listed on their presentence
investigation report support a new ACCA sentence even without the
residual clause, sometimes even when no judge ever sentenced the prisoner
based on those convictions.100 The Eleventh Circuit has even done the same
with prisoners sentenced under the Guidelines. That is, when prisoners
97

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(1) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015), amended by U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES SUPPLEMENT TO THE 2015
MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
98
§ 924(e)(2)(B); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2015), amended by U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES SUPPLEMENT TO THE 2015 MANUAL
§ 4B1.2(a)(2) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
99
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015).
100
See, e.g., In re Aiken, No. 16-12847-J (11th Cir. June 23, 2016); In re Alford, 16-12748-J (11th
Cir. June 20, 2016); In re Carrasquillo, No. 16-12506-J (11th Cir. June 17, 2016); In re Thompson, No.
16-12595-J (11th Cir. June 17, 2016); In re Branson, 16-12675-J (11th Cir. June 16, 2016); In re
Brown, 16-12557-J (11th Cir. June 16, 2016); In re Edwards, No. 16-12693-J (11th Cir. June 16, 2016);
In re Townsend, No. 12-12659-J (11th Cir. June 16, 2016); In re Bell, No. 16-12532-J (11th Cir. June
15, 2016); In re Cruz, No. 16-12530-J (11th Cir. June 15, 2016); In re Franks, No. 16-12564-J (11th
Cir. June 15, 2016); In re Parrish, No. 16-12652-J (11th Cir. June 15, 2016); In re Venta, No. 1612698-J (11th Cir. June 15, 2016); In re White, No. 16-12570-J (11th Cir. June 15, 2016); In re Austin,
No 16-12699-J (11th Cir. June 14, 2016); In re Creighton, No. 16-12580-J (11th Cir. June 14, 2016); In
re Martin, No. 16-12503-J (11th Cir. June 14, 2016); In re Mims, No. 16-12574-J (11th Cir June 11,
2016); In re Sawyer, No. 16-12501-J (11th Cir. June 10, 2016); In re Safeeullah, No. 16-12443 (11th
Cir. June 9, 2016); In re Hudson, No. 16-12243-J (11th Cir. June 8, 2016); In re Parks, No. 16-12404-H
(11th Cir. June 8, 2016); In re Payne, No. 16-12290 (11th Cir. June 6, 2016); In re Knight, No. 1612132-J (11th Cir. June 3, 2016); In re Garner, No. 16-12109-J (11th Cir. June 1, 2016); In re Little,
No. 16-11979-J (11th Cir. May 27, 2016); In re McKinney, No. 16-11948-J (11th Cir. May 26, 2016);
In re Turner, No. 16-11914-A (11th Cir. May 25, 2016); In re Leonard, No. 16-11925-J (11th Cir. May
24, 2016); In re Smith, No. 16-11901-C (11th Cir. May 24, 2016); In re Yawn, 16-12729-J (11th Cir.
May 20, 2016); In re Simmons, No. 16-11563-B (11th Cir. May 4, 2016); In re Young, No. 16-11532A (11th Cir. Apr. 28, 2016). This is a list of some of the split-panel rulings between April 18 (the date
Welch was decided) and June 26 (the one-year statute of limitations deadline on Johnson claims) of
which we are aware, all denying motions. Because these orders are not published on the Eleventh
Circuit’s website or a searchable database, they are nearly impossible to find other than by serially
looking up docket numbers in the Eleventh Circuit’s Case Management/Electronic Case Files system.
There were surely many more rulings like this, including ones issued after June 26 and ones issued by
unanimous panels.
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sentenced under the Guideline’s residual clause filed challenges based on
Johnson, the Eleventh Circuit sometimes gave an alternative ground for
denying them permission to file a § 2255 motion. Instead of denying
permission to file a § 2255 motion because the Guideline is not
unconstitutionally vague (which is the result required by current Eleventh
Circuit precedent), the Eleventh Circuit has denied successive § 2255
motions on the ground that even if the Supreme Court later holds that the
Guideline is unconstitutional, a prisoner’s other convictions will support a
higher sentence anyway so their claim would have to be denied in the
future.101 In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit is preemptively ensuring that
these prisoners would not benefit from a favorable decision in Beckles. And
the Eleventh Circuit makes this hypothetical determination about how
prisoners’ Beckles claims would fare based only on a form filled out by a
prisoner and sealed records called up by the court, all without argument or
briefing.102 The form that prisoners fill out does not allow them to attach
any materials, including proposed motions,103 and the Eleventh Circuit
issues denials within thirty days of receiving requests for authorization.104
The Second and Sixth Circuits have already adopted a different
approach to the Eleventh Circuit’s treatment of potential Beckles claims,
one which minimizes the risk that prisoners’ claims are judged prematurely
(and potentially incorrectly). This approach also minimizes the risk that a
prisoner’s claim will get lost in an unnecessary cycle of filing and refiling.
When asked to authorize a successive motion by a prisoner sentenced under
the residual clause in the Guidelines, the Sixth Circuit has been transferring
cases to district courts to hold in abeyance pending a decision in Beckles.
The Sixth Circuit explained:
Not only is the standard for assessing [a successive] motion light, but the
setting for reviewing it counsels against making more law than necessary. A
denial of a motion to authorize a successive petition is unreviewable—not by
the en banc court, not by the Supreme Court. By granting such a motion, even
101

E.g., In re Burgest, 829 F.3d 1285, 1287 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Even if we were to assume that . . .
Johnson also applies to . . . the Guidelines, Burgest would not be entitled to relief.”); In re Davis,
829 F.3d 1297, 1302 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[E]ven if we were considering in this current application a
Johnson challenge to the district court’s application of the Guidelines’ career offender enhancement,
Davis could not make a prima facie showing that Johnson impacted that sentencing decision because he
clearly had two qualifying predicate offenses.”); In re Sams, 830 F.3d 1234, 1240 (11th Cir. 2016)
(“[E]ven if Johnson retroactively applies to the Guidelines, Sams’s claims still fail.”).
102
For problems with relying on presentence investigation reports at the authorization stage, see In
re Leonard, Nos. 16-13528-J, 16-13804-J, 16-13857-J, 2016 WL 3885037, at *8–9 (11th Cir. July 13,
2016) (Martin, J., concurring). Once a § 2255 motion is filed in district court, the additional time,
briefing, and potential input from lawyers obviate these concerns.
103
In re Jackson, 826 F.3d 1343, 1349 & n.6 (11th Cir. 2016).
104
See In re Anderson, 829 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2016); supra text accompanying note 65.
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many such motions (roughly 1700 Johnson motions have been filed in our
circuit), we decide nothing with finality. The habeas statute permits the district
court to determine for itself whether the petitioner has met the gatekeeping
requirements of § 2255(h). Congress has also asked us to make these decisions
quickly, ideally within 30 days of a motion’s filing and often with little if any
briefing. All features of this setting considered, it makes sense to leave the
district court free to decide [the issue].105

The Sixth Circuit further reasoned that “[t]he Supreme Court’s recent
decision to review Beckles also supports this approach” because a decision
in that case will provide “answers to the pertinent questions.”106
The Second Circuit has taken this same approach of holding these
cases in abeyance until there is a ruling in Beckles.107 The Eleventh Circuit,
by contrast, has specifically declined requests to hold “application[s] in
abeyance due to the grant of certiorari in Beckles.”108 The Eleventh Circuit
was the only court that took that same approach after the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Welch.109
B.

Relevance of Supreme Court Decisions on Element-of-Force and
Enumerated-Crime Clauses

Another issue that lurks beneath Beckles is whether Supreme Court
decisions like Descamps v. United States110 and Mathis v. United States111
play any role in deciding whether prisoners’ prior convictions support their
ACCA sentence despite Johnson. Descamps112 and Mathis113 set out the
proper interpretation of ACCA’s element-of-force and enumerated-crime
clauses (and accordingly the Guidelines’ identical versions of those

105

In re Embry, 831 F.3d 377, 382 (6th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
Id.
107
See Blow v. United States, 829 F.3d 170, 171–72 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[B]ecause the Supreme Court
will likely decide in Beckles whether Johnson applies retroactively to the Guidelines, the district court
is instructed to hold Blow’s § 2255 motion in abeyance pending the outcome of Beckles.”).
108
In re Bradford, 830 F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th Cir. 2016).
109
See In re Clayton, 829 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2016) (Martin & Pryor, JJ., concurring) (“[U]nlike
all other circuits, the Eleventh Circuit refused to stay applications for successive § 2255 motions
pending Welch.” (citation omitted)).
110
133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013).
111
136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016).
112
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281–82 (holding that “sentencing courts may not apply the modified
categorical approach when the crime of which the defendant was convicted has a single, indivisible set
of elements”).
113
Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2247–48 (A “prior crime qualifies as an ACCA predicate if, but only if, its
elements are the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense. The question in this case is
whether ACCA makes an exception to that rule when a defendant is convicted under a statute that lists
multiple, alternative means of satisfying one (or more) of its elements. We decline to find such an
exception.”).
106
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clauses). Both cases abrogated many prior court of appeals cases
interpreting those other clauses,114 but the Eleventh Circuit has said
Descamps and Mathis can be ignored when deciding whether a prisoner’s
prior convictions qualify as criminal history predicates. The Eleventh
Circuit has even refused to apply Descamps for Johnson claims filed by
prisoners who were sentenced after the decision in Descamps.115
The Eleventh Circuit’s reason for refusing to apply the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the element-of-force and enumerated-offense
clauses is that the Supreme Court has not “made” decisions like Descamps
114

See, e.g., United States v. Lockett, 810 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Before Descamps,
our Court ‘assumed that the modified categorical approach could be applied to all non-generic
statutes. . . . The Descamps decision dictates discarding that assumption.’” (quoting United States v.
Howard, 742 F.3d 1334, 1343 (11th Cir. 2014))).
115
See, e.g., In re Cook, No. 16-12745 (11th Cir. June 17, 2016). The Cook ruling helps illustrate
how Descamps and Johnson interact. Mr. Cook was sentenced under ACCA because he had a previous
Florida burglary conviction. Id. at 4. Seven years before Mr. Cook’s 2014 sentencing, the Supreme
Court held that Florida burglary convictions are violent felonies under ACCA’s residual clause even if
they are not violent felonies under the enumerated-crimes clause. See James v. United States, 559 U.S.
192, 209–10 (2007). Right before Mr. Cook was sentenced, the Court held in Descamps in 2013 that
California burglary convictions can never count as violent felonies under the enumerated-crimes clause.
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2293. Descamps essentially confirmed that Florida burglary convictions also
can never count as violent felonies under the enumerated-crimes clause. Of course, Descamps did Mr.
Cook little good in 2014, since James meant that his burglary conviction still counted under the residual
clause. But once Johnson struck ACCA’s residual clause in 2015, the enumerated-crimes clause was the
only way this burglary conviction could support an ACCA sentence. But when Mr. Cook asked the
Eleventh Circuit for permission to file a § 2255 motion raising a Johnson claim, a split panel denied that
request based on pre-Descamps precedent holding that Florida burglary meets ACCA’s enumeratedcrimes clause definition, no matter that Descamps may have overruled that precedent as of the time of
Mr. Cook’s sentencing. See Cook, No. 16-12745-J, at 5–6.
As it happens, Cook was decided two days after another Eleventh Circuit panel issued a published
(and therefore binding) order that granted a different prisoner’s request to challenge his ACCA sentence
because the sentence was based on a Florida burglary conviction. See In re Adams, 825 F.3d 1283,
1284 (11th Cir. 2016) (granting motion). This means that even though Mr. Cook and Mr. Adams
received mandatory ACCA sentences based on the same exact prior crimes, their Johnson claims had
totally different outcomes. Mr. Adams was able to file a § 2255 motion, and the United States (which
never gets to weigh in when the Eleventh Circuit denies permission to file a § 2255 motion) agreed that
his sentence must be vacated. See United States v. Adams, No. 16-CV-22252, 3 (S.D. Fla. June 30,
2016). Meanwhile, Mr. Cook’s identical § 2255 claim began and ended with the application form he
sent to the Eleventh Circuit, and this ruling cannot be reviewed.
Mr. Cook is one of many prisoners in the Eleventh Circuit whose ACCA sentences were based on a
Florida burglary but who will never get to challenge their sentence, even though others with identical
sentences have already won relief. See, e.g., In re Chisholm, Nos. 16-13946-J, 16-14638-J (11th Cir.
July 27, 2016); In re Yawn, No. 16-12729-J (11th Cir. June 20, 2016); In re Carrasquillo, No. 16-12506
(11th Cir. June 17, 2016); In re Branson, No. 16-12675-J (11th Cir. June 16, 2016); In re Brown, No.
16-12557-J (11th Cir. June 16, 2016); In re Parrish, No. 16-12652-J (11th Cir. June 15, 2016); In re
McKinney, No. 16-11948-J (11th Cir. May 26, 2016); In re Thomas, 823 F.3d 1345, 1349 (11th Cir.
2016); In re Young, No. 16-11532-A (11th Cir. Apr. 28, 2016) (all denying motions for ACCA
convictions based on Florida burglary). Again, these are just a few examples we are aware of. Because
the majority of these orders are not published or reported, they are difficult to track down.
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and Mathis retroactive.116 But that is not a basis for refusing to apply
binding precedent when deciding a Johnson claim. Where a prisoner
challenges an ACCA sentence, the prisoner’s new claim is based on
Johnson (and where a prisoner challenges a Guideline sentence, the
prisoner’s new claim will be based on Beckles). When a court decides a
Johnson claim, Descamps and Mathis merely indicate whether a prisoner’s
prior convictions serve as predicates under one of the clauses that survived
Johnson. Put another way, Descamps and Mathis inform whether any
Johnson violation would be harmless because a prisoner’s sentence remains
valid despite Johnson. But this does not mean Descamps or Mathis provide
the new rule that such a prisoner is seeking relief under. If a prisoner’s
sentence was valid up until the moment Johnson (and potentially Beckles)
was decided, then Johnson (or Beckles) is the new rule that allows courts of
appeals to authorize successive motions.
There are other reasons why courts cannot ignore Mathis and
Descamps when deciding whether a claim meets § 2255(h)’s requirements,
as Johnson claims do (and as Beckles claims would). First, Mathis and
Descamps explain how ACCA’s language (and the Guideline’s language)
should be applied, as a matter of statutory interpretation.117 And the
Supreme Court’s “judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative
statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision.”118
“[O]nce the Court has spoken, it is the duty of other courts to respect that
understanding of the governing rule of law.”119 Because decisions of
statutory interpretation reflect what a statute meant when it was enacted—
and, accordingly, when a prisoner was sentenced under it—Mathis and
Descamps reflect both the sentence a prisoner could receive when he was
116

E.g., In re Hires, 825 F.3d 1297, 1303 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that “Descamps is retroactive
for a first § 2255 motion” but does not apply to successive-motion questions). This is another issue on
which the Eleventh Circuit is split. See, e.g., Adams, 825 F.3d at 1285–86 (applying Descamps).
117
To be sure, Descamps discussed additional rationales for the Court’s holding on top of the
statutory interpretation rationale. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2287 (“First, it comports with ACCA’s
text and history. Second, it avoids the Sixth Amendment concerns that would arise from sentencing
courts’ making findings of fact that properly belong to juries. And third, it averts ‘the practical
difficulties and potential unfairness of a factual approach.’” (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.
575, 601 (1990))). But these additional rationales do not make Descamps any less of a statutory
interpretation decision. The fact that the Court said its reading of ACCA was more convenient and more
constitutional than other readings does not make that reading of that statute any less authoritative a
reading of the text. To the contrary, “[t]he so-called canon of constitutional avoidance is an interpretive
tool,” much like other interpretative tools. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 516
(2009); see also Ezell v. United States, 778 F.3d 762, 763 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We hold that the Supreme
Court did not announce a new rule of constitutional law in Descamps. Rather, it clarified—as a matter
of statutory interpretation—application of the ACCA in light of existing precedent.”).
118
Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1994).
119
Id. at 312.
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initially sentenced and also the sentence a prisoner could receive if the
prisoner were resentenced today.
Second, nothing in § 2255 requires courts to apply incorrect
interpretations of statutes or Guidelines just because they would have done
so at the time of sentencing. AEDPA’s special requirements for successive
motions simply say that these motions need to “contain . . . a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
Supreme Court.”120 After Welch, there is no question that Johnson meets
that definition. And so a motion filed by a prisoner whose sentence was
valid up until the day Johnson was decided “contain[s]” a Johnson claim.
The rest of § 2255 imposes no further restrictions on what cases courts can
use to analyze the merits of successive § 2255 motions. To the contrary,
§ 2255(a) provides for relief where “the sentence was imposed in violation
of the Constitution or laws of the United States.”121 If a prisoner’s prior
crimes no longer fall under ACCA’s language after Johnson (or the career
offender Guidelines after Beckles), the prisoner is (in the language of
§ 2255(a)) “in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of
Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States.”122
Third, Mathis and Descamps apply to successive motions under the
retroactivity doctrine established by Teague v. Lane.123 Teague says “new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those
cases which have become final before the new rules are announced.”124
Mathis and Descamps are not “constitutional rules of criminal procedure”;
they are decisions of statutory interpretation, and the Supreme Court has
made clear that “decisions that narrow the scope of a criminal statute by
interpreting its terms”125 are “not subject to the [Teague] bar.”126 On top of
that, even if Descamps and Mathis were subject to the Teague bar, Mathis
and Descamps appear to be old rules, rather than new ones.127 The Supreme
120

28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) (2012).
Id. § 2255(a).
122
Id.
123
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
124
Id. at 310.
125
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004).
126
Id. at 352 n.4; see also Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1267–68 (2016) (describing
why decisions of statutory interpretation are not subject to the Teague bar); Bousley v. United States,
523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998) (“[B]ecause Teague by its terms applies only to procedural rules, we think it
is inapplicable to the situation in which this Court decides the meaning of a criminal statute . . . .”).
127
See, e.g., Mathis v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2243, 2257 (2016) (“Our precedents make this a
straightforward case. For more than 25 years, we have repeatedly made clear that application of ACCA
121
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Court has made clear that “[u]nder the Teague framework, an old rule
applies both on direct and collateral review.”128 Accordingly, not applying
Mathis and Descamps when deciding § 2255 claims violates “the Teague
framework.”
CONCLUSION
AEDPA’s removal of Supreme Court review of denials of permission
to file successive § 2255 cases creates a power that is unlike anything else
in federal law. Courts of appeals are almost never allowed to act with no
possibility of further review. The Eleventh Circuit’s response to Johnson
and Welch shows how dangerous this power can be. The Eleventh Circuit’s
outlier approach also raises serious constitutional issues. In Felker v.
Turpin, the Supreme Court held that AEDPA’s restrictions on review over
these cases did not violate the Suspension Clause. Writing separately,
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer, noted: “[I]f it should
later turn out that statutory avenues other than certiorari for reviewing a
gatekeeping determination were closed, the question whether the statute
exceeded Congress’s Exceptions Clause power would be open. The
question could arise if the courts of appeals adopted divergent
interpretations of the gatekeeper standard.”129 Felker was decided less than
a month after AEDPA was enacted. Twenty years later, Justice Souter’s
concerns have come to pass, along with others he did not anticipate, such as
division within a circuit on the proper gatekeeping standard.
Although AEDPA prohibits the Supreme Court from reviewing
denials of authorization by way of petitions for certiorari, the Court could
use the claim raised by Mr. Beckles to address how courts like the Eleventh
Circuit are denying authorization. The Court could, for example, explain
the contours of the right announced in Beckles, including whether decisions

involves, and involves only, comparing elements.”); Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283
(2013) (“Our caselaw explaining the categorical approach and its ‘modified’ counterpart all but resolves
this case.”); see also Ezell v. United States, 778 F.3d 762, 763 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he Supreme Court
did not announce a new rule of constitutional law in Decamps. Rather, it clarified—as a matter of
statutory interpretation—application of the ACCA in light of existing precedent.”); United States v.
Davis, 751 F.3d 769, 775 (6th Cir. 2014) (“The Supreme Court in Descamps explained that it was not
announcing a new rule, but was simply reaffirming the Taylor/Shepard approach . . . .”); United States
v. Montes, 570 F. App’x 830, 831 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he Descamps decision did not recognize a new
right.”). Though both Descamps and Mathis drew dissenting opinions, “[d]issents have been known to
exaggerate the novelty of majority opinions; and ‘the mere existence of a dissent,’ like the existence of
conflicting authority in . . . lower federal courts, does not establish that a rule is new.” Chaidez v.
United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1110 n.11 (2013) (quoting Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 416 n.5
(2004)).
128
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007).
129
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 667 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
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like Mathis and Descamps inform any determination that a prisoner’s prior
convictions qualify as criminal history predicates. The Court could also
provide some rare guidance about what is required to make a prima facie
showing to obtain authorization to file a successive motion, as well as how
courts of appeals should make that determination.
AEDPA and the Eleventh Circuit have combined forces to make it
almost impossible for prisoners to get judicial review of potentially
unconstitutional sentences. The same prisoners who the Eleventh Circuit
has kept out of court would have fared differently in other circuits. When
the Supreme Court set out its modern retroactivity doctrine in Teague, it
declared that “the harm caused by the failure to treat similarly situated
defendants alike cannot be exaggerated: such inequitable treatment ‘hardly
comports with the ideal of “administration of justice with an even
hand.”’”130 The aftermath of Johnson and Welch shows that lower courts
cannot always be trusted to “treat similarly situated defendants alike” when
deciding which prisoners can file successive § 2255 motions based on a
new landmark decision. AEDPA insulates those rulings from the review
and accountability that exist for nearly everything else courts of appeals do.
If the Supreme Court rules in Mr. Beckles’s favor, it should be mindful of
those unique restrictions and write its opinion in a way that prevents a
repeat of the mess that unfolded after Johnson and Welch.

130

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 315 (1989) (quoting Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233,
247 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted)).
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